
# **Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette**

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January 7, 1993 1993-92

### **GOLD MINING INDUSTRY**

Gold Mining Companies Must Prepare for Another Tough Year To Insure Survival

These remarks were prepared in advance by John C. Tumazos for presentation as moderator's comments at the 1993 DLJ Gold Exploration Seminar in New York on January 12-13.

# LONG-TERM REASONS TO FAVOR GOLD

We do not expect today's gold prices to last, and believe that longer-term gold prices need to be roughly \$100 per ounce above current levels to sustain gold output in the five largest gold producing nations around the world. At present the global gold mining industry is not replacing reserves nor maintaining underground mine development schedules.

Jewelry consumption, which has exceeded mine output each year since 1989, is a particular favorable underpinning to gold prices. Although jewelry demand growth has approached 9% in 1992, we have simulated gold markets in 1993-1996 based on a 4% demand growth rate that is more consistent with global population and GNP growth rates. Our estimate of 2% decay rate in global gold mine output suggests that the annual supply shortfall in the gold market will increase by more than 6% of consumption or over 125 metric tonnes annually. We estimate that the disinvestment necessary to balance the market will rise from 130 metric tonnes in 1991 and 292 in 1992 to 387 in 1993 and 815 by 1996 (Table 1), which represents 33% of prospective gold supply by 1996. We do not believe that central banks, mining company forward sales, European institutions, Middle Eastern sheiks or individual investors are likely to dishoard on that scale. Several prominent North American gold mining companies no longer hedge, for example.

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Additional information is available upon request.

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Global Gold Supply and Demand (metric tonnes)

1			1	V.K								
	2010							85			-815	
	2071			CA				85		4.3	-672	
1994	2100	425	2525	6.4				85		6.1	-541	1850
1993	2155	425	2580					85			-387	2391
1992	2180	400	2580	2300	147	55	65	85	220	2872	-292	2778
1991	2156.6	409.5	2566.1	2111.1	146.7	55.3	75.1	88.2	220.0	2696.4	-130.3	3069.6
1990	2132.1	490.0	2622.1	2036.7	147.8	52.7	59.1	84.7	210.0	2591.0	31.2	3199.8
1989	2063.8	359.8	2423.6	1907.0	136.5	50.9	62.9	82.3	200.0	2442.6	-18.9	3168.7
1988	1919.0	350.8	2269.8	1531.8	132.7	50.5	70.8	78.2	190.0	2054.0	215.8	3187.6
1987	1743.6	431.8	2175.4	1214.5	124.0	47.7	103.2	71.6	180.0	1741.0	434.5	2971.8
1986	1649.0	490.2	2139.2	1167.8	123.0	51.1	169.2	67.4	170.0	1748.5	390.7	2537.4
1985	1578.8	317.4	1896.2	1187.1	114.4	53.3	9.19	0.89	160.0	1644.4	251.8	2146.7
1984	1506.5	291.4	1797.9	1092.9	130.4	52.4	62.6	88.2	150.0	1576.5	221.5	1894.9
1983	1452.2	294.1	1746.3	842.4	106.4	51.3	88.0	86.7	140.0	1314.8	431.6	1673.4
1982	1366.0	243.3	1609.3	935.6	88.8	9.09	81.7	93.9	130.0	1390.6	218.7	1241.9
1981	1303.0	244.1	1547.1	798.2	92.8	65.2	113.5	91.1	120.0	1280.8	266.4	1023.2
1980	1271.8	493.0	1764.8	513.2	95.2	64.3	122.5	102.8	110.0	1008.0	756.8	756.8
	Global Mine Output	Western Scrap	Total New Supply	Western Jewelry	Western Electronics	Western Dentistry	50% of W. Official Coinage	W. Indus Decorative. Medals	Former Communist Use	Total Demand	Implied Investment	Cumulative Investment

Source: Gold Fields Services for historical data; DLJ Estimates for Forecasts and Former Communist Demand History

Clearly, the twin U.S. deficits, low interest rates in the United States, a gradual end to the credit crunches in America, Japan and Europe, and the expansionary policies of the new Administration may benefit gold. It is no accident that the dollar weakened 2% following the announcement of Senator Lloyd Bentsen as the Treasury Secretary nominee. Traditionally, gold and other commodity prices rebound as the global economy grows.

Most important, current gold prices are too low to sustain the gold mining industry. Our estimate of 2% annualized mine output decay from 1993 to 1996 may prove generous if gold prices continue to drop. Most new gold mine projects around the world do not offer 10% pretax returns below a \$400 per ounce gold price. It is a given that all commodity markets eventually recover after a sustained period of low prices force participants to exit, and gold's demand growth profile provides some added comfort.

# **NEAR-TERM IMPEDIMENTS TO A GOLD PRICE RALLY**

The gold market has several hurdles to overcome before it can rally: 1) the tendency of the U.S. dollar to appreciate in the second half of 1992, 2) stubborn Bundesbank tight monetary policy with 8% German long-term interest rates, 3) gradual 2% M2 money supply growth rates in the United States, 4) generally tight bank credit conditions globally, 5) investor fears of central bank bullion reserve liquidations, 6) investor fears of gold mining company forward sales, 7) continued private disinvestment and 8) general investor disinterest.

None of these problems is insurmountable. Gold prices now have fallen in nominal terms for five straight years, however, since peaking near \$500 an ounce in mid-December 1987 and averaging \$486 for that month. Average prices have dropped from \$446 in 1987 to \$437 in 1988 to \$381 in 1989 to \$384 in 1990 to \$362 in 1991 to roughly \$344 an ounce in 1992. This is the longest period of sustained gold price decline since gold price decontrols from the \$35 per ounce level began to be implemented in 1968. Gold price volatility has contracted along with the gold price, which has added to investor disinterest.

Twenty-six months have passed since the Federal Reserve began to attempt to ease monetary policy in November 1990 in the midst of the Persian Gulf Crisis. Commodity price deflation has continued despite bond and stock market rallies, lower U.S. interest rates and six straight quarters of U.S. real GNP growth. Now that an "end of recession" rally seems tardy in the United States, the next hopes will be center on either an "end of German or Japanese recession" or else simply waiting for a traditional cyclical peak in commodity pricing several years from now.

## REVISED GOLD PRICE FORECASTS

We have reduced our gold price forecast to \$345 per ounce from \$370 for 1993 and to \$360 from \$400 for 1994. We have remained at \$400 for 1995 and 1996 and \$425 for 1997-2000. We have reduced our earnings estimates for most of the gold mining companies for 1993 and 1994 accordingly (see Table 3). Our reduced gold price forecasts are not consistent with economics necessary to sustain output in the five principal gold producing regions: South Africa, the United States, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Australia and Canada. The arithmetic involved in reaching gold prices of \$370 per ounce for 1993 requires nearly a \$400 fourth quarter average to offset recent prices near \$335, which seems farfetched at the moment in view of near-term monetary, exchange rate and inflation trends. Oil prices have not been sufficient to encourage North American reserve replacement for two decades, and the temptation to expect a \$100 price rally

simply because gold mining economics require it may be cause for folly. Only three of the 35 major South African gold mines—Kloof at \$247, Driefontein Consolidated at \$205 and Elandsrand at \$248—had working costs at competitive levels in the September quarter. Twenty of South Africa's major mines had costs over \$300 an ounce.

# OUR INVESTMENT RATINGS REFLECT A FAVORABLE BIAS TOWARD WELL FINANCED GOLD COMPANIES

Our emphasis of gold shares continues to center on the better financed firms that may be able to seize opportunities in the current tough market environment. We are also attracted to the major Carlin Trend companies, whose long-term exploration prospects may benefit from the fertility of their landholdings. Concentration on the better financed companies will be the best strategy until a robust gold price rally to well over \$360 develops.

We currently include American Barrick and Newmont Mining on our Recommended List due to their superior finances, superior cost positions and mine development efforts. We rate Coeur d'Alene Mines very attractive owing to the company's cash balances of more than half its stock market value and the potential of silver prices to rebound as well as gold. We recently reduced our investment rating for Canyon Resources to neutral from an Analyst's Buy because the continued poor gold price environment has made it tougher for Canyon to raise the capital necessary to maintain its ownership stakes and develop its properties. We rate Battle Mountain, Crown Resources, FMC Gold, LAC Minerals, Newmont Gold, Pegasus Gold and Placer Dome moderately attractive as well, which connotes a 5-20% expected return in DLJ's rating criteria. We rate Echo Bay Mines, Teck Corp., Homestake Mining and Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold neutral, and Amax Gold and Freeport-McMoRan Inc. unattractive.

### LACK OF ACCESS TO CAPITAL FOR GOLD MINING FIRMS

North American gold mining firms face the most hostile business climate imaginable today. Most companies cannot afford exploration programs, those lucky enough to have discovered new deposits often cannot finance or obtain environmental permits to extract their resources, the North American environmental atmosphere is hostile, the \$8.90 one-year COMEX gold price contango provides a mere 2.7% one-year return for hedging activities, commercial banks are reluctant to lend for development of gold deposits having more than \$200 per ounce in direct mining costs as today's gold prices provide little margin for a desirable threefold interest coverage ratio on a long-life property, the SEC may someday ask gold mining companies to apply current prices to their annual reserve disclosures, common equity offerings are not available to many firms and even a stronger concern like *Newmont Mining* had to resort to a relatively expensive 5.5% convertible preferred to raise capital. *Echo Bay Mines* and *FMC Gold* have had their joint venture partners abdicate mining properties to them, which may be an increasing trend.

Gone are the days of \$450 per ounce spot prices, 10% one-year contangoes in excess of spot prices, gold bullion loans at 2% annual costs, easy common stock offerings at 35 times earnings, Canadian flow-through exploration shares or European investor interest. There are no longer: 1) a tent city along the Humboldt River on the east side of the Carlin Tunnel, 2) a 90-day waiting list for reputable hotels in Battle Mountain, 3) a need for analysts to phone mining companies to borrow a bed in their geologists' trailer apartments in Battle Mountain, 4) fully booked flights to Elko or Ely or 5) reasons to make a reservation for a rental car in Elko.

# STRATEGIES TO INSURE SURVIVAL FOR ANOTHER YEAR OR TWO AT ANOTHER 5% GOLD PRICE DECLINE

Past speakers at our annual seminar included *Galactic Resources, Northgate Exploration*, and *International Corona*, which have not survived after implementing financial strategies requiring gold prices nearer to \$400 an ounce. *Freeport-McMoRan Gold Co.* has chosen to sell out, winning better returns for its shareholders in a falling gold market. *Homestake Mining, Amax Gold, LAC Minerals, FMC Gold, Placer Dome, Battle Mountain, Pegasus* and others have made acquisitions in the 1989-1992 time frame that could have been made less expensively if the buyers had waited.

Clearly a prudent manager must have a realistic contingency plan for another 5% decline in gold prices to perhaps \$310 per ounce that extends for another year or two. One unpleasant scenario involves a "saucer-shaped" bottom in which prices simply stay near current levels. Gold mining companies that are producing less than 400,000 ounces annually or have less than a \$400 million stock market capitalization appear more vulnerable since they have least access to equity markets or lenders. A prudent investor must consider the same contingencies in order to measure risk and returns.

In our view, only five companies in the smaller size class under 400,000 ounces of future gold output or \$400 million in stock market value are completely secure financially. *Franco-Nevada* and *Euro-Nevada* have cash balances and virtually no operating expenses or capital investment requirements. *Teck Corporation* has a strong balance sheet, low costs at its Hemlo units and substantial nongold assets. *FMC Gold and Coeur d'Alene Mines* each have cash balances of more than \$150 million even if their reduced mine operations do not generate much new cash next year.

The remaining companies in the smaller size class below the top 14-sized producers must 1) take measures to avert a liquidity crisis in the next two years and 2) preserve the upside potential for their shareholders' values to recover in the future. Simple cost controls applied to operations, exploration or administration cannot generate enough cash for some companies.

Some organizations face capital commitments to continue existing operations, develop new mines, repay debts or fund losses. None of the means to raise external capital today is attractive. The public equity market, debt markets, bank loans, joint venture opportunities or outright asset sales are all depressed. We do not expect bank lenders to renew credits in view of the anemic interest coverage ratios or relatively short reserve lives that the typical gold property offers today. We do not expect outside auditors, common stock underwriters or the SEC to strictly police the use of the word "reserve," although clearly "reserves" that do not offer a 5% return on capital at current gold prices have limited resale value.

The shareholders of a public company do not benefit when it issues stock at low prices in desperation to bridge a short-term funding need. It would be better to sell the entire concern at the market price or perhaps a modest premium rather than drive the stock price down by issuing shares into a depressed market.

### MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS EMINENTLY LOGICAL

Buyers remain available when entire companies are put up for sale. The underfinanced companies, whether larger or smaller sized, have their best opportunity to preserve shareholder value in merg-

ing with stronger companies in common stock exchanges, which offer upside recovery potential to the shareholders of both firms.

The larger-sized firms ought to save at least \$10 million in annual administrative and exploration expenses and the smaller companies at least \$4 million annually via mergers. *Homestake Mining* estimates that it will save \$25 million annually simply from cutting 180 administrative and exploration personnel before considering other merger savings.

Assuming reasonable exchange ratios can be agreed upon, the losers in a merger are the share-holders of illiquid concerns or the redundant employees. The reluctance of large shareholders to recognize lost value or the anxieties of potentially redundant senior managers may delay the occurrence of some obvious mergers.

Notwithstanding, it appears that perhaps one-third of the North American gold mining companies under 400,000 ounces in size or \$400 million in market value and perhaps several of the larger concerns will merge into larger concerns in 1993 or 1994. We applaud this trend because it will create larger, better capitalized investment vehicles with reduced aggregate administrative expenses. We do not expect the creative activity of unemployed exploration personnel to be lost inasmuch as such individuals usually resurface at smaller, emerging firms.

# APPROPRIATE ROLE OF WELL-CAPITALIZED FIRMS IS TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITY

We cannot stress enough that the appropriate role of the well-capitalized or cash-rich firms is to seize opportunities. American Barrick, Newmont Mining, Placer Dome, RTZ, Minorco, Teck Corp., LAC Minerals, FMC Gold, Coeur d'Alene Mines, Franco-Nevada and Euro-Nevada are the best positioned companies to make acquisitions from the standpoint of liquidity. As the most probable cash buyers on the market they can choose among the potential sellers. Of course, numerous other players may enter the fray in common stock-based acquisitions.

Several of these fine firms decline to acquire gold properties, however, owing to the poor financial returns that acquisition candidates offer. For these reasons *Placer Dome, Teck Corporation, Cambior, LAC Minerals, Minorco, Anglo-American* and *RTZ* recently have bought into copper or zinc properties. The redeployment of capital or development expertise into base metals poses a threat to the underfinanced gold producers that wait until it is too late to decide to sell out. Clearly the companies unable to find mating partners face unpleasant financial realities until gold prices rebound markedly.

## **UPDATED GOLD MINE VALUATION MODELS**

At present the market values the top 15 North American gold producers at roughly \$1,525 per ounce of estimated 1996 output, \$128 per ounce of recoverable reserves as defined to exclude higher cost "reserves," roughly 12 times estimated 1993 cash flow and roughly 25 times estimated 1993 earnings (Table 2). Average valuations have been relatively stable considering the erosion in gold prices and unfulfilled investor expectations of recent months.

The usefulness of the price/earnings ratios as analytic tools is debatable today. At least one-third of the top 15 gold producers and at least half of the smaller companies are not likely to report prof-

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# NORTH AMERICAN GOLD VALUATION MODELS

			Output	Total										1996E	1996E
		4	1996E Net	Cap.Per									Net Debt +	Production	EPS Change
Company	Price	By	Gold-Equiv	Oz. 1996E	Price 1	Price to Cash Flow	Į.	P/E	P/E	P/E	Capitaliz.	Reserves	Cap. Exp.	Per share	To \$10 Gold
Company	CCILIT		IIIOus. Oz	output	77661	76661		77661		100	(Class I)		/ MINL. Cap.	(20 10.)	III Cellis/sitale
Placer Dome Inc#	11.25	1	1956	1133	8.7	8.7	8.7	26.8	29.6	25.0	301	179	19%	92.0	3.8
Newmont Mining#	40.50	7	1720	1772	21.3	22.5	12.5	29.6	36.8	20.3	160	139	24%	2.31	18.0
Newmont Gold Co#	31.25	3	1700	1811	20.8	18.4	13.0	39.1	34.7	20.8	154	154	12%	1.62	12.6
American Barrick#	30.38	4	1668	2783	17.4	13.2	10.5	24.3	17.4	13.8	172	172	13%	1.14	8.9
Homestake Mining#	10.63	2	1400	1111	12.5	11.2	11.8	NM	NM	42.5	102	102	20%	1.03	7.2
Freeport-M Cu+Au	22.13	. 9	1093	2023	19.1	20.9	11.3	33.0	40.2	18.0	NM	74	16%	0.50	2.5
LAC Minerals #	5.00	7	716	783	5.6	6.3	9.5	NM	NM	33.3	124	92	42%	0.61	3.1
Echo Bay Mines#	4.75	00	730	945	7.3	7.9	5.9	NM	NM	21.6	59	59	122%	09.0	4.2
Battle Mountain#	2.00	6	557	1075	12.2	8.3	4.5	NM	NM	14.3	313	114	112%	99.0	4.6
Cambior	9.34	10	550	643	6.5	5.3	4.4	29.2	25.2	19.9	295	128	105%	1.49	7.5
Pegasus Gold	14.00	11	497	923	8.8	8.5	7.0	NM	41.2	23.3	133	133	62%	1.52	9.01
Santa Fe Pacific#	13.00	12	475	NM	NM	NM	10.8	16.3	13.0	9.3	66	NM	13%	0.26	1.8
Hemlo Gold	00.9	13	460	1099	10.9	10.9	10.0	17.6	17.6	21.4	72	72	%0	0.48	2.4
Amax Gold Inc	8.50	14	403	1810	17.6	15.5	10.0	35.4	NM	50.0	384	209	87%	0.54	3.8
TVX Gold	1.97	15	401	1083	5.6	0.9	3.9	24.6	32.8	11.6	284	71	84%	0.22	1.5
Teck Corp	13.27	16	350	384	13.3	12.6	9.7	29.5	29.5	11.1	29	29	2%	0.43	2.1
Royal Oak Mines	1.50	17	340	321	7.5	5.4	4.3	9.4	7.5	5.0	55	55	18%	0.45	3.1
FirstMiss Gold	5.63	18	225	581	4.8	4.5	4.7	23.4	18.8	22.5	104	104	265	1.25	8.8
Nerco#	12.00	19	219	NM	NM	NM	NM	NM	12.6	12.0	456	NM	201%	0.46	3.2
Hecla Mining#	7.50	20	194	1454	15.0	14.7	10.7	NM	NM	NM	189	189	77%	0.43	3.0
Coeur d'Alene	10.50	21	188	408	NM	NM	8.4	NM	NM	52.5	46	39	11%	0.50	3.5
Agnico Eagle	4.25	22	178	810	7.1	7.7	7.1	NM	21.3	17.0	111	1111	32%	0.56	4.0
FMC Gold Co@	4.38	23	175	952	6.7	10.9	15.6	19.0	NM	NM	104	104	-25%	0.24	1.7
Bema Gold	0.62	24	116	209	NM	NM	1.6	NM	NM	2.1	61	16	289%	0.30	2.1
Glamis Gold	4.06	25	115	742	5.6	5.1	4.1	20.8	29.0	16.3	95	95	26%	0.55	3.8
Crown Resources*	6.75	26	100	875	NM	NM	6.1	NM	NM	7.5	109	109	-5%	0.73	5.1
Franco-Nevada	20.65	27	100	2726	25.8	19.7	11.8	25.8	19.7	11.8	151	151	-11%	89.0	4.7
Dickenson Mines	3.00	28	95	965	10.0	10.0	5.0	45.9	55.6	12.0	78	78	84%	0.46	3.2
Rayrock	8.06	29	06	849	7.3	0.9	5.4	NM	NM	26.9	130	130	84%	0.55	3.9
Atlas Corp.	4.88	30	08	386	6.7	7.5	4.9	NM	NM	NM	75	75	130%	1.26	8.8
Canyon Resources*	1.75	31	80	727	6.3	17.5	8.8	NM	NM	NN	36	36	122%	0.27	1.9
Euro-Nevada	12.58	32	75	2397	44.9	36.0	15.7	44.9	36.0	15.7	120	120	-16%	0.44	3.1
USMX INC.	2.63	33	09	523	13.1	12.2	5.8	NM	NM	13.1	42	42	2%	0.40	2.8
							1								
Avg Valuation of top 15 Producers	roducers			1357	12.4	11.7	8.7	27.6	28.9	23.0	189	121	21%	0.92	6.2
Avg Valuation of Smaller Producers	Producer	8		006	12.4	12.1	7.5	27.9	28.8	22.1	110	87	%09	0.55	3.8

Comments: (1) to calculate "total Cap, per ounce of production" we added the stock market capitalization to debt-equivalents and subtracted cash and securities. We converted silver output into gold at the current ratio of 90 to one.

(5) We have excluded negative or extreme outlying data points in our calculations of industry average valuations above.

<sup>(3)</sup> Some valuation ratios are lower because their mines have short lives or do not generate free cash flows. Thus, interpretation of these ratios depends on inferred asset quality. (2) In our earnings sensitivity to metals price changes we assumed a 50% marginal tax rate for Quebec, Ontario and Papua New Guinea and a 30% marginal tax rate elsewhere.

<sup>(4) &</sup>quot;Class I" reserves are located in the U.S., Canada and Australia, while "global" reserves include all properties worldwide.

Table 3
TRADITIONAL VALUATION MEASURES

	Ġ.	PDC and Cold Delan	old De																	1993E
	4303	4304	TI DIO	47.11	4	000		1	1										Price/	Pretax
Commons	7000	+000	7000	4994	9343	2400		Cash Fi	-				Book	Book Value Per Share	er Shar	9	ROE	ROE	Book	Breakeven
Company	1989	1990	1991	1992E	1993E	1996E	1989	1990	1991	1992E 1	1993E 1	1996E	1990	1991	1992E 1993E	993E	1992E	1993E	1993E	Price
Placer Dome Inc#	0.45	0.81	-0.94	0.45	0.38	0.45	0.94	1.29										5.9%	171%	\$290
Newmont Mining#	1.87	5.06	1.39	1.37	1.10	2.00	2.10	1.75	_									27.6%	955%	\$305
Newmont Gold Co#	1.13	1.35	1.20	0.80	0.90	1.50	1.85	2.14	1.75									11.0%	363%	\$275
American Barrick#	0.30	0.45	89.0	1.25	1.75	2.20	0.77	68.0										22.5%	353%	\$250
Homestake Mining#	0.65	0.21	-1.30	-1.10	0.00	0.25	1.05	0.54										0.0%	311%	\$345
Freeport-M Cu + Au	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.67	0.55	1.23	0.89	96.0	_									17.3%	7007	\$200
LAC Minerals #	0.31	-0.53	0.12	0.04	-0.06	0.15	09.0	96.0	1.04									-1.2%	%66	\$355
Echo Bay Mines#	0.16	09.0-	0.07	-0.09	-0.15	0.22	0.97			0.65	09.0	080	4.37	4.62	4.46	4.24	-2.0%	-3.4%	112%	\$375
Battle Mountain#	0.40	-0.24	-0.02	09.0-	-0.05	0.35	0.80											-1.5%	157%	\$355
Danging Cold	0.62	0.68	0.38	0.32	0.37	0.47	0.99											4.2%	104%	\$325
Sente Es Designation	0.41	-1.55	0.37	-0.24	0.34	09.0	1.62											4.0%	161%	\$325
Dania re racinon	0.00	69.0-	0.54	0.80	1.00	1.40	N											14.6%	178%	\$300
hemio Gold	0.31	0.23	0.13	0.34	0.34	0.28	0.57											14.3%	244%	\$225
Amax Gold Inc	0.55	0.47	0.35	0.24	0.07	0.17	0.80											2.0%	241%	\$375
I VX Gold	-0.03	0.10	0.05	80.0	90.0	0.17	0.02											3.9%	127%	\$317
leck Corp	1.15	0.95	0.39	0.45	0.45	1.20	1.50											5.1%	147%	\$275
Royal Oak Mines	NZ.	-0.90	0.21	0.16	0.20	0.30	NM											19.8%	135%	\$320
FirstMiss Gold	0.31	0.01	0.00	0.24	0.30	0.25	0.50											11.1%	197%	\$320
Nerco#	1.90	2.05	2.12	-5.50	0.95	1.00	080											7.7%	94%	\$410
Hecla Mining#	-0.83	0.19	-0.51	-0.40	-0.25	0.20	0.17											-5.4%	168%	\$390
Coeur d'Alene	-0.29	-0.30	-0.94	-0.25	-0.45	0.20	1.19											-4.0%	95%	\$400
Agnico Eagle	-0.57	-1.60	-2.49	0.24	0.20	0.25	0.00											12.2%	250%	\$290
Finic Gold Cold	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.23	-0.04	0.03	1.00	0.88	0.53									-1.2%	128%	\$355
Glamis Gold	60.0-	0.07	60.0-	01.0-	-0.10	0.30	0.02											24.1%	105%	NM
Crown Decompack	07.0-	17.0	0.00	0.08	0.14	0.25	0.10											8.4%	238%	\$300
Franco Nevada	21.0-	0.00	60.0-	00.0	05.0-	0.90	-0.13											29.7%	785%	\$500
Piotogo Mi	0.43	1.03	0.00	0.80	1.05	1.75	0.25											24.6%	441%	\$50
Dickenson Mines	0.44	-1.93	0.37	0.07	0.05	0.25	0.49											1.9%	102%	\$350
Naylock	0.34	0.30	0.20	0.00	-0.02	0.30	1.31	1.50										-0.6%	239%	\$345
Auas Corp.	-0.86	0.88	-1.25	-1.18	-0.90	0.25	1.17	_										18.4%	84%	\$380
Canyon Kesources*	-0.33	-0.28	0.10	-0.54	-0.10	0.05	-0.05										300	11.4%	211%	\$400
LIGHTY INC	0.08	0.13	0.23	0.28	0.35	0.80	0.08											8.1%	280%	\$100
COIMIN IIV.	0.10	17.0	0.14	0.01	70.0	0.20	0.40	0.38										1.0%	156%	\$330

Average Values Top 15 Gold Producers Average Values of Smaller Producers

7.5% 8.1% 285% \$308 -4.0% 0.3% 214% \$324

Source: Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette

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# SUMMARY STOCK INFORMATION

	Price	6	Market	All Debte	Noncold	Letimoted			- Contract of the Contract of		Dunlas	1000		Est.	Est. Gold Reserves	ves
	(FISC)	Charge	Con	Tage and		rstilliated	Ė	to	Milellit.		Explor.	LYYOE	output	0.3.+		
	(460)	Silaics	Cap	less cash	Assets	3-rear	HICKEL		rield	27-week	Expense	I pons.	Oz.	Canada +		Keserve
Company	1/4/93	Outstd	(\$Mul)	(SMII)	(\$ Mul.)	Cap. Exp.	Symbol	Divd	(%)	Range	(\$Mil)	Gold	Silver	Australia	Foreign	Life
Placer Dome Inc#	11.25	236.9	2665.1	-250.0	200.0	750.0	PDG	0.25	2.2	12-9	0.09	1800	14000	7356	5042	69
Newmont Mining#	40.50	74.5	3017.3	30.0	0.0		NEM	09.0	1.5	54-36	55.0	1720	0	19000	3000	12.8
Newmont Gold Co#	31.25	104.9	3278.1	-200.0	0.0		NGC	0.05	0.2	52-30	14.5	1700	0	20000	0	11.8
American Barrick#	30.38	145.9	4431.7	210.0	0.0	350.0	ABX	0.13	0.4	33-22	5.0	1668	0	27000	0	16.2
Homestake Mining#	10.63	136.5	1450.3	280.0	175.0		HM	0.20	1.9	17-10	15.0	1400	0	15256	0	10.9
Freeport-M Cu + Au	22.13	215.1	4759.1	-46.9	2500.0		FCX	09.0	2.7	24-16	10.0	1071	2011	0	29715	34.7
LAC Minerals #	5.00	147.1	735.5	32.0	50.0		LAC	0.11	2.2	8-5	14.0	006	1500	5785	2010	8.7
Echo Bay Mines#	4.75	122.3	580.9	108.9	0.0	0.009	ECO	0.07	1.5	8-4	5.6	730	13	116911	0	0.91
Battle Mountain#	5.00	84.7	423.5	175.0	0.0		BMG	0.05	1.0	9-6	12.0	555	140	1914	3316	9.4
Cambior	9.34	36.8	343.7	0.09	50.0		CBJ.TO	0.12	1.3	10-6	5.0	550	0	1200	1566	5.0
Pegasus Gold	14.00	31.4	438.9	20.0	0.0		PGU	0.10	0.7	11-61	7.3	475	2000	3460	0	7.3
Santa Fe Pacific#	13.00	180.9	2351.7	180.0	6.6861		SFX	0.10	8.0	14-11	17.0	475	0	5500	0	9.11
Hemlo Gold	9009	8.96	580.5	-75.0	0.0		HEM	0.16	2.7	9-01	13.0	460	0	7030	0	15.3
Amax Gold Inc	8.50	74.4	632.1	7.76	0.0		AU	80.0	6.0	13-8	11.0	400	300	1900	1600	8.8
TVX Gold	1.97	136.6	268.9	165.5	0.0		TVXTF	0.00	0.0	4-2	3.0	300	8000	1530	4625	20.5
Teck Corp	13.27	81.7	1084.3	-350.0	0.009		IEKB.TO	0.17	1.3	19-13	13.0	350	0	4654	0	13.3
Royal Oak Mines	1.50	0.97	114.0	-5.0	0.0	25.0	RYO	0.00	0.0	2-1	0.5	340	0	2000	0	5.9
FirstMiss Gold	5.63	18.0	101.3	29.5	0.0		FRMG	0.00	0.0	6-3	2.5	225	0	1258	0	5.6
Nerco#	12.00	39.2	470.4	745.0	400.0		NER	0.00	0.0	11-91	4.0	180	3500	1789	0	6.6
Hecla Mining#	7.50	34.7	260.3	70.0	47.5		HL	0.00	0.0	12-7	5.7	150	4000	1500	0	10.0
Coeur d'Alene	10.50	22.1	231.6	-125.0	30.0		CDE	0.15	1.4	18-11	2.3	110	7000	1675	300	18.0
Agnico Eagle	4.25	31.0	131.8	12.0	0.0	30.0	AEAGF	80.0	2.5	6-3	4.0	175	200	1300	0	7.4
FMC Gold Co@	4.38	73.5	321.6	-155.0	0.0		FGL	0.05	1:1	6-4	11.5	175	0	1600	0	9.1
Bema Gold	0.62	39.0	24.2	0.0	0.0	70.0	BGO.TO	0.00	0.0	2-1	0.0	116	0	400	1095	12.9
Glamis Gold	4.06	21.0	85.3	0.0	0.0		GLGVF	0.05	1.2	4-3	0.3	1115	0	006	0	7.8
Crown Resources*	6.75	13.7	92.5	-5.0	0.0		CRRS	0.00	0.0	9-5	2.0	100	0	800	0	8.0
Franco-Nevada	20.65	14.8	305.6	-33.0	0.0	0.0	FN.TO	0.24	1.2	26-16	0.2	100	0	1800	0	18.0
Dickenson Mines	3.00	20.6	61.7	30.0	0.0	22.0	DMLA	0.00	0.0	4-3	1.0	95	0	1175	0	12.4
Rayrock	8.06	16.3	131.4	20.0	75.0	0.06	RAY.TO	0.00	0.0	8-4	3.5	06	0	589	0	6.5
Atlas Corp.	4.88	6.3	30.9	0.0	0.0	40.0	AZ	0.00	0.0	7-4	2.5	08	0	410	0	5.1
Canyon Resources*	1.75	29.7	52.0	6.2	0.0	57.0	CYNR	0.00	0.0	3-1	0.3	80	0	1625	0	20.3
Euro-Nevada	12.58	17.1	214.8	-35.0	0.0	0.0	EN.TO	0.03	0.2	16-11	0.2	75	0	1500	0	20.0
USMX INC.	2.63	15.0	39.4	-8.0	0.0	10.0	USMX	0.00	0.0	3-1	2.0	09	0	750	0	12.5
Totals			29710	230	7113	7436			0.0		307.0	16870	17661	154247	63360	
Course				100	7770	1400			0.7		204.7	07001	40074	146461	27707	7.7

We define "reserves" to exclude minority interests, ownership stakes without access to cash flows, recovery losses or mines with cash costs of \$300 in one of the two prior years. We distingluish between "class one reserves" in the U.S., Canada and Australia and those in all other nations having greater political risks, in our opinion. We define "all debts less cash" to exclude convertible securities already counted in "fully diluted shares outstg." to avoid double-counting them.

its in 1993, and some others may register meager earnings too slender to permit meaningful price/earnings calculations.

The valuations of the smaller producers tend to be different from those of the larger 15 firms. The smaller deposits do not enjoy economies of scale, and the smaller companies sometimes have higher fixed administrative or exploration overheads per ounce produced. Consequently, the smaller companies are less profitable per ounce produced on average. The stock market values the smaller firms at roughly \$920 per ounce of estimated 1996 production and \$90 per ounce of recoverable reserves as defined, which is a 30-40% discount to those of the top 15 firms (Table 2). The market values the smaller firms at roughly 22 times their typically more slender earnings and 7.6 times cash flow margins, although the analysis of price to cash flow or price/earnings ratios for the smaller firms does not appear meaningful owing to their current collective earnings status.

We have graphically presented eight important data series in bar charts (1-8) to simplify the visual presentation of our valuation database.

## PROSPECTIVE VALUATIONS WHEN GOLD PRICES RECOVER

The potential profile of the major North American companies in 1996 will be different. Today's 33 major firms with a nearly \$29 billion aggregate market value (Table 4) probably will have merged into 20-25 concerns to save \$100-200 million in collective administrative and exploration expenses, which translates into a minimum savings of \$6-12 per ounce over the 15 million ounces of gold that we expect these firms to produce worldwide.

We look for the average reserve life of the North American-based firms to shrink toward 8.5 years from the recent ten-year level (Table 4) and roughly 12-year level seen five years ago. Moreover, we expect the North American-based gold producers to increase the fraction of their reserves held in LDCs or nations other than the United States, Canada or Australia to rise from 24% at present toward 35%. The combination of production increases, reduced levels of exploration activity, redirection of exploration efforts abroad to avoid North American environmental complications and declassification of higher cost reserves all have served to delay reserve replacement and reduce reserve lives. Property write-offs will continue and mine idlings increase as long as gold prices decline.

During the 1980s we looked to the 24% annualized growth rate of North American gold output to justify premium valuations that typically were twice the level of the overall stock market. Sixfold production growth over the course of a decade and fertile exploration potential commanded investor interest.

Contemporary environmental trends, reduced exploration activity, reduced access to capital and the sustained period of low gold prices all threaten to reduce North American gold output between the years 2000 and 2005. Common stocks tend to become sensitive to reserve lives when they range from five to eight years, such as those now approached by *Placer Dome, LAC Minerals, Pegasus Gold, Cambior, Royal Oak Mines, FirstMiss Gold* or *Agnico-Eagle*. Valuations become quite depressed after the most profitable zones fall within a four-year remaining life as the performance of *Battle Mountain, FMC Gold* or *Amax Gold* demonstrated in 1990-1992.

We look for the relative valuation of gold shares to suffer if current trends continue and reserve lives dwindle. We estimate that a gold price of \$400 will be necessary in 1996 to justify the present

\$29 billion market capitalization of the 33 companies that we monitor. The valuation of reserves and production will be about the same as seen today, but the valuation of earnings and cash flow probably will be at a 30-40% discount to today's levels owing to the shortening of reserve lives. Higher gold prices are necessary to generate the increased earnings and cash flows needed to support current valuations.

Placer Dome and Newmont Mining are the only North American companies that have maintained very large scale gold exploration programs of roughly \$50 million annually despite the recent gold price declines. Teck Corporation, Newmont Gold, Homestake Mining, Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, LAC Minerals, Hemlo Gold, Santa Fe Gold and Amax Gold each maintain exploration efforts amounting to \$12-17 million annually. The exploration programs of Battle Mountain, FMC Gold or perhaps a few others may be scaled back slightly from the lower end of that range. Expending money sometimes facilitates exploration success.

We believe that plenty of gold remains to be found both in North America and around the world. Man doesn't understand many of the ways that gold occurs in nature. The odds weigh against the delineation of large amounts of gold in 1993-1995, however, owing to contemporary environmental, exploration activity and economic trends and the lead times inherent in the exploration process. Clearly those firms that have laid off most of their geologists have lower odds of discoveries.

While global gold mining costs weigh against too much more erosion in the gold prices, time will run out for some of the undercapitalized firms in 1993 or 1994 unless gold prices rally robustly in the coming year. Investors should be attentive to the financial wherewithal of gold companies in choosing their investments in the coming year.

John C. Tumazos, CFA (212) 504-4233

Note: Prices are as of the close, January 4, 1992.

Anglo-American Gold (AAGIY): 27/8 Equinox Resources (EQX.To): C\$1.87 Freeport-McMoRan Inc. (FTX)@: 171/4 Galactic Resources (GLC): 1/32 Granges (GXL.To)#: 17/16 Northgate Exploration (NGX)#: 1/2 RTZ (RTZ): 411/2

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Chart 1
Capitalization per Ounce of Global Reserves




Chart 2 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette




Chart 3
1993 Estimated Price to Cash Flow




Chart 4 **Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette** 1993 Estimated Price to Earnings





Chart 5
Pretax Breakeven Gold Price



# Chart 6 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Estimated Reserve Life in Years





Chart 7
Net Debt and Estimated Capital Spending Budget as a Percentage of Market Capitalization



# Chart 8 Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette

# Estimated Exploration Budgets (\$ in millions)

